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CHANCELLOR KENT AND THE SEARCH FOR THE
ELEMENTS OF IMPEACHABLE OFFENSES
MICHAEL J. GERHARDT*
INTRODUCTION
I imagine that more than a few people are wondering why a
symposium in honor of Chancellor James Kent includes an essay on the
scope of impeachable offenses. After all, Chancellor Kent focused
primarily on the judiciary's special role in the development of American
equity and common law. Moreover, Chancellor Kent distrusted
legislatures and did not devote his creative energies to explicating
congressional lawmaking or the legislative process. When Chancellor
Kent did address impeachment, he had little to say, and the little he did
say seemed primarily descriptive, such as his acknowledgement of im-
peachment as the principal means for disciplining federal judges for
"any corrupt violation of their trust."'
Yet, there is more. If one reads further in Chancellor Kent's
commentaries, there is another comment about impeachment that is of
great contemporary significance for anyone interested in the
constitutional limitations on judicial independence. In his first
introductory lecture given to aspiring law students at Columbia
University, Chancellor Kent acknowledged impeachment as the
principal checking mechanism against judicial abuse of power. Like
Alexander Hamilton,2 Chancellor Kent expected the exercise of judicial
review to be "the weakest of all" powers in the Constitution, entailing
nothing more than the exercise of reasoned judgement.' If this power
* Professor of Law, The College of William & Mary. B.A., Yale University; M.Sc., London
School of Economics; J.D., University of Chicago. I completed this article months before the House
of Representatives began its impeachment inquiry against President Bill Clinton. I am very grateful
to Hal Krent and the editors of the Chicago-Kent Law Review for the opportunity to participate in
this wonderful symposium honoring Chancellor James Kent and to Charlie Geyh and Neil Kinkopf
for their helpful comments on early drafts of this essay.
1. 1 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 295 (12th ed. 1884).
2. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 437-38 (Alexander Hamilton) (Issac Kramnick ed., 1987).
3. See James Kent, An Introductory Lecture to a Course of Law Lectures, in 2 AMERICAN
POLITICAL WRITING DURING THE FOUNDING ERA 1760-1805, at 936, 943 (Charles S. Hyneman &
Donald S. Lutz eds., 1983).
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were abused, i.e., "if [any federal judge] should at any time be prevailed
upon to substitute arbitrary will, to the exercise of a rational Judgment,
as it is possible it may do even in the ordinary course of judicial
proceeding," the judiciary "is not left like [the legislature], to the mere
contro[]l of public opinion. The Judges may be brought before the
tribunal of the Legislature, and tried, condemned, and removed from
office."
'4
Chancellor Kent did not elaborate on the reasons he thought it
would be appropriate to impeach a federal judge on the basis of certain
decisions. Nevertheless, Kent's comment is useful today to many people
who express interest in trying to impeach "activist" judges.5 Kent's
suggestion that it is permissible for Congress to impeach a federal judge
for his or her erroneous constitutional decisions is not a novel argument,
for every generation has toyed with the possibility of impeaching judges
for their most unpopular decisions.
The purpose of this essay is to explore the continued importance of
Kent's suggestion of impeaching judges for erroneous decisions. Part I
examines the significance of the apparent conflict between the
aforementioned suggestion and Kent's repeated expressions of distrust
of legislatures and pronouncements regarding the need for judicial
independence to protect against legislative abuses of power. Part I
suggests that Kent's faith in judicial review of all constitutional issues
(including any raised in impeachment proceedings) probably provides
the basis for resolving the tension in Kent's statements.
Part II identifies the likely sources that would serve in the impeach-
ment context as an analogue to the precedents and tradition on which
the common law that was the focus of Kent's commentaries was based.
The sources of the law of federal impeachment include the text and the
history of the Constitution and particularly historical practices and
tradition.
Part III explores in some detail how the application of the skills
required for judicial development of the common law, as suggested by
Kent, elucidates the essential elements of impeachable offenses. These
elements include, most notably, the requirements of mens rea-a
culpable mind-set-and actus reus-the commission of certain bad acts
that cause serious injury to the Republic.
4. Id. at 943-44.
5. See, e.g., David Kairys, Clinton's Judicial Retreat: When Naming Judges, He Is Quick to
Cave, WASH. POST, Sept. 7, 1997, at C1-C2 (noting House Majority Whip Tom Delay's proposal
that "activist" judges should be impeached).
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As discussed in Part IV, the essential elements of impeachable
offenses limit the circumstances in which a federal judge may be
impeached for a decision. Such impeachments are permissible when a
federal judge repeatedly flouts his or her duty to follow a well-settled
principle of law, order, or directive from a higher authority, such as the
Supreme Court. It is both ironic and significant that Chancellor Kent,
who never intended to explicate the impeachment process, identified a
solution to a problem of current and future concern involving the
appropriate bases for judicial impeachment.
I
The first issue raised by Chancellor Kent's suggestion that judicial
impeachments may be based on arbitrary decisions is whether the
suggestion is reconcilable with his repeated pronouncements about the
importance of judicial independence from political retaliations. For
Chancellor Kent, the judiciary occupied a special place in the
constitutional universe as the primary protector of individual rights,
particularly property rights. He viewed an independent judiciary as
essential to guarantee natural rights from the threat of excessive
democratic impulses. As Kent explained:
[I]n monarchical governments, the independence of the judiciary is
essential to guard the rights of the subject from the injustice of the
crown; but in republics it is equally salutary, in protecting the
constitution and laws from the encroachments and the tyranny of
faction. Laws, however wholesome or necessary, are frequently the
object of temporary aversion, and sometimes of popular resistance.
It is requisite that the courts of justice should be able, at all times,
to present a determined countenance against all licentious acts; ...
[and] [t]o give them the courage and firmness to do it, the judges
ought to be confident of the security of their.., station.6
According to Chancellor Kent, a fundamental reason for the
Constitution's granting life tenure to federal judges was that legislatures
could not be-and indeed, should not be-trusted to act responsibly
absent judicial review. According to Kent, legislatures were prey to a
number of pernicious influences: the "insidious operation of factions,"7
the overbearing nature of legislative majorities, and the pressure of
popular enthusiasms, which make legislatures "liable to be constantly
swayed by popular prejudice and passion."8
6. 1 KENT, supra note 1, at 294.
7. Id. at 332.
8. Id. at 422.
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If legislatures generally should not be trusted, but the most
powerful of them all-Congress-wielded the single most important
check against judicial abuse of power, it would follow that Congress
could not be expected in an impeachment proceeding to behave itself
properly or to be immune to the usual pressures or inclinations likely to
corrupt its performance. If Congress were the final judge of arbitrari-
ness in impeachment proceedings, the exercise of judicial review would
expose federal judges to the possibility of impeachment in any case in
which they ruled against Congress.
While Chancellor Kent acknowledged the importance of judicial
review as a check against legislative abuses of power and the
significance of impeachment as a limit on judicial misconduct, he did not
explain how, or even whether, one might trust impeachment to work
given the propensity of legislatures to act arbitrarily, if not maliciously.
Kent never explained what, if anything, protected judges from being
abused by Congress in the federal impeachment process because of
their decisions.
Yet, one can extrapolate a possible reconciliation of these
pronouncements from the same introductory lecture in which
Chancellor Kent proclaimed that it would be legitimate to impeach
judges because of their arbitrary decisions. In defending the need for
judicial review, Kent explained:
[I]f the Legislature was left the ultimate Judge of the nature and
extent of the barriers which have been placed against the abuses of
its discretion, the efficacy of the check would be totally lost. The
Legislature would be inclined to narrow or explain away the
Constitution, from the force of the same propensities or
considerations of temporary expediency, which would lead it to
overturn private rights. 9
Kent's statement could be read as suggesting the possibility that, if left
unchecked, Congress might be disposed to deviate from or to take great
liberties with the Constitution in determining upon which judicial
decisions to base impeachment proceedings. The normal check against
legislative deviations generally was judicial review. As Kent explained:
The Courts of Justice which are organized with peculiar advantages
to exempt them from the baneful influence of Faction, and to
secure at the same time, a steady, firm and impartial interpretation
of the Law, are therefore the most proper power in the
Government to keep the Legislature within the limits of its duty,
and to maintain the Authority of the Constitution.1°
9. Kent, supra note 3, at 942.
10. Id.
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This is not surprising, for Chancellor Kent believed that judicial review
of constitutional matters "is necessary to preserve the equilibrium of the
government, and prevent usurpations of one part upon another; and of
all parts of government, the Legislative body is by far the most
impetuous and powerful."11 Kent had far more confidence in the
judiciary's ability to properly exercise its power than he had in the
legislature's capacity for doing so.
12
The problem at this stage is that it is not clear how either Congress
or the federal judiciary would determine the kinds or range of arbitrary
judicial decisions on which to base judicial impeachments. One could
easily imagine that Congress might lean in the direction of a broad
definition to preserve for itself the flexibility in retaliating against the
decisions that most of its members disliked, while federal judges might
endorse a much narrower definition to protect their autonomy in
exercising judicial review.
Once again, it is possible to discern a resolution to this dilemma
from Chancellor Kent's commentaries on the common law. Given
Chancellor Kent's belief that judges had the training and skill to deduce
the appropriate principles and rules to govern the common law, they
likewise possessed the abilities to deduce the law of impeachment,
including the appropriate scope of impeachable offenses. Presumably,
they-or others similarly trained and disposed-could do this by
applying reasoned judgment to those sources of authority in the im-
peachment field analogous to the materials on which the common law
has been based-i.e., the text and history of the Constitution, historical
practices, and tradition.
II
The Constitution sets forth the grounds for impeachment in
relatively opaque language. The Constitution provides that "all civil
Officers of the United States, shall be removed from Office on Im-
peachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high
Crimes and Misdemeanors."' 3 The Constitution defines treason as
"consist[ing] only in levying War against [the United States], or in
11. Id. at 943.
12. For an especially thoughtful commentary in support of judicial review of the impeachment
process, see Rebecca L. Brown, When Political Questions Affect Individual Rights: The Other Nixon
v. United States, 1993 Sup. Cr. REV. 125. But see Gerald Gunther, Judicial Hegemony and
Legislative Autonomy: The Nixon Case and the Impeachment Process, 22 UCLA L. REV. 30 (1974).
13. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
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adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort." 14 Moreover,
"Bribery" has been widely understood as encompassing an indictable
crime, even though not made indictable by Congress until 1790.15 The
Constitution does not, however, define any of the other offenses for
which one may be impeached. Consequently, the perennial challenge
has been to clarify the phrase "high Crimes and Misdemeanors" by
means of other authoritative sources of constitutional meaning.
The most obvious sources of constitutional meaning are the text
and history of the Constitution. Moreover, in a field such as separation
of powers (and there is no question that impeachment is a component
of the constitutional scheme of separation of powers), congressional
practices, particularly if they are consistent or unbroken over time, have
been generally regarded as useful guides for illuminating constitutional
meaning.16 Consequently, another source to consider in deciphering the
phrase "high Crimes and Misdemeanors" is the history of Congress'
exercise of impeachment authority.
If past impeachment proceedings carry some weight in elucidating
the meaning of the phrase "high Crimes and Misdemeanors," it is not
clear precisely how much weight they do carry. The precedential effect
of such proceedings often seems strongest if a question of constitutional
interpretation is involved. In such a case, Congress appears to have
been especially sensitive to the likely permanent impact, including any
harm, of its decisions on the Constitution and on its relationship with
the other federal branches in both the short- and long-terms.
1 7
Congressional reaction to the outcome of the first impeachment
proceeding illustrates the potentially lasting influence of a constitutional
decision made by Congress in an impeachment matter. That proceeding
was initiated by Representative John Q. Adams in 1797 against William
Blount, a United States Senator from Tennessee. The House impeached
Senator Blount for taking various actions to undermine the relationship
between the United States and native Americans, and for conspiring to
aid England in its war with Spain despite the official neutrality of the
United States. 8 By a vote of twenty-five to one, the Senate expelled
14. Id. art. III, § 3, cl. 1.
15. See id. art. II, § 4; 18 U.S.C. §§ 201-203 (1994); see also Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9, § 21, 1
Stat. 112, 117 (1845) (establishing bribery for the first time as a federal criminal offense).
16. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610 (1952) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
17. See MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL IMPEACHMENT PROCESS: A CONSTITUTION-
AL AND HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 47 (1996).
18. Blount was specifically charged with (1) conspiring to lead a military expedition on behalf
of England to take land in Florida and Louisiana from Spain, thus violating the neutrality of the
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Blount on July 8, 1797, the day following his impeachment in the
House. 9 Blount challenged the Senate's jurisdiction to subject him to an
impeachment trial.20 He claimed that he was not a "civil officer" of the
United States within the meaning of the Constitution."' He argued that
"civil officers" were only those appointed by the President; that the
clause providing for their removal upon impeachment for, and
conviction of, high crimes and misdemeanors applied only to such "civil
officers"; and that the impeachment process, therefore, could not be
used to punish a Senator.22 On January 10, 1799, the Senate voted
fourteen to eleven to defeat a resolution stating that Blount was a "civil
officer" of the United States and, therefore, subject to impeachment. 23
By the same margin, the Senate voted on January 11, 1799, to dismiss
the impeachment resolution against Blount for lack of jurisdiction.
24
Neither the House nor the Senate subsequently has entertained any im-
peachment action against a member of either chamber.
2 1
In contrast, the influence of impeachment decisions involving
mixed questions of constitutional interpretation and policy, such as the
legality or effectiveness of using trial committees, primarily depends on
the preferences of current members of Congress. For example, there are
several reasons not to interpret the Senate's rejection of the third article
of impeachment against Judge Harry Claiborne in 1987-asking for
issue preclusion based on prior felony convictions -as a lasting rejection
of the application of collateral estoppel in the impeachment context.
First, the third article of impeachment did not directly ask the senators
United States in the war between Spain and England; (2) inciting the Creek and Cherokee Indians
to commit hostile acts against the Spanish; (3) alienating the confidence of the Indians in the United
States agent residing with them; (4) convincing another United States agent to assist him in the
expedition; and (5) conspiring "to diminish and impair the confidence of the said Cherokee nation in
the Government of the United States." 7 ANNALS OF CONG. 951 (1798); see also 3 A. HINDS'
PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES § 2302, at 653 (1907) [hereinafter HINDS'
PRECEDENTS].
19. See 7 ANNALS OF CONG. 43-44 (1797).
20. See 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 2248 (1798).
21. See 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 2271-72 (1799); HINDS' PRECEDENTS, supra note 18, § 2310, at
663.
22. See 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 2270-72 (1799); HINDS' PRECEDENTS, supra note 18, § 2316, at
671.
23. See 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 2318 (1799); HINDS' PRECEDENTS, supra note 18, § 2318, at 679.
24. See 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 2319 (1799); HINDS' PRECEDENTS, supra note 18, § 2318, at 679.
25. Most commentators who have addressed this issue agree with the congressional opposition
to the impeachability of national legislators. See, e.g., John D. Feerick, Impeaching Federal Judges: A
Study of the Constitutional Provisions, 39 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 26 (1970); Michael J. Gerhardt, The
Constitutional Limits to Impeachment and Its Alternatives, 68 TEx. L. REv. 1, 48-50 (1989); C.S.
Potts, Impeachment as a Remedy, 12 ST. LOUIS L. REv. 15, 30 (1927). For a contrary view, see
Ronald D. Rotunda, An Essay on the Constitutional Parameters of the Federal Impeachment, 76 KY.
L.J. 707,716 (1987).
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about whether Claiborne's prior convictions settled certain key facts
underlying his impeachment. Second, despite the Senate's refusal to
endorse the third article, it is unclear whether the prior felony
convictions strongly motivated senators to convict Judge Claiborne on
the other two articles. As Senator Carl Levin admitted, "My own gut
feeling is one way or another, following some fiction or reality, we will
find a way to remove somebody from office who [has] been convicted of
a crime [and] who [has] exhausted the appeal .... 26 Third, Judge
Claiborne's acquittal on the third article was made possible by thirty-
five senators voting present rather than on the merits of the third
article. 27 While Senator Levin has suggested that the thirty-five present
votes were cast to indicate those senators did "not want[] to base the
removal on the conviction itself, '28 those same votes could reflect a
desire (by at least some senators) simply to avoid taking a stand on the
issue. Lastly, the third article of impeachment against Judge Claiborne
may have gone too far, i.e., asked the Senate to find that a felony
conviction is an impeachable offense, rather than to make an independ-
ent judgment as to whether, accepting the facts underlying a felony
conviction, the conduct in question constituted an impeachable
offense.
29
Of course, Congress retains the authority or discretion to reach a
different conclusion even as to a matter of constitutional interpretation.
Moreover, impeachments rarely present pure questions of constitution-
al law, and it is unusual for Congress not to follow some prior impeach-
ment practice (assuming it is discernible and known), unless it decides
that modern circumstances require updating or abandoning certain
procedures for the sake of efficiency, expediency, or fairness. One
example of the latter situation is that, despite having approved Rule XI
in 1935,30 the Senate did not invoke the rule in Judge Ritter's 1936 im-
peachment trial partly because a number of senators continued to
express doubts about its constitutionality.31 Subsequently, the Senate
26. Hearings Before the National Commission on Judicial Discipline and Removal, 103rd Cong.
161 (1993) [hereinafter Hearings] (testimony of Senator Carl Levin on May 15, 1992).
27. See PROCEEDINGS OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE IN THE IMPEACHMENT TRIAL OF
HARRY E. CLAIBORNE, A JUDGE OF THE UNITED STATES DIsTRIcT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF
NEVADA, S. Doc. NO. 99-48, at 289-97 (1987).
28. Hearings, supra note 26, at 161 (testimony of Senator Levin).
29. See Stephen B. Burbank, Alternative Career Resolution: An Essay on the Removal of
Federal Judges, 76 KY. L.J. 643, 683-84 (1988).
30. See S. Res. 18, 74th Cong., 79 CONG. REC. 8309-10 (1935).
31. See PROCEEDINGS OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE IN THE TRIAL OF IMPEACHMENT OF
HALSTED L. RrITER, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF
FLORIDA, S. Doc. NO. 74-200, at 47 (1936).
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has given no indication that it is legally bound to use Rule XI trial
committees.
If Congress were to give some precedential effect to its prior
decisions in impeachment proceedings, it still must confront the
troublesome matter of figuring out the meaning of a specific precedent.
The difficulty of achieving consensus on the precise significance of a
prior impeachment decision may preclude that precedent from having
any seriously binding effect on a subsequent Congress, or may make it
easier for subsequent members of Congress to interpret the prior
practice or judgment in a way that suits their present purposes.
Modifying impeachment procedures has been further complicated by
institutional inertia to maintain tradition, as reflected in its requirement
of unanimous consent for modifying procedural rules32 and preference
for allowing each member to vote his or her conscience on the
appropriate law or standards to apply.
Four examples illustrate the dilemmas involved in relying on an im-
peachment decision as embodying a single principle of law. Each
demonstrates that the likely weight Congress will give to an impeach-
ment precedent depends heavily on the collective will and desires of
current members of Congress, the facts of the case, and the political
climate in which an impeachment inquiry or investigation arises.
One confusing precedent is the Blount impeachment. The Senate's
votes on the impeachment resolution against Senator Blount can be
read as reflecting the Senate's view-or at least that of the fourteen
senators who voted against the impeachment resolution and assertion of
jurisdiction against him-that senators are not impeachable officials.
Those votes, however, could be construed in other ways. The attempt to
impeach and convict Senator Blount arguably reflects the kinds of party
divisions and regional antagonisms that existed during the early years of
the nation. Blount was a Republican. Ten of the eleven senators voting
to assert impeachment jurisdiction over Blount were Federalists; and
five out of the six Republicans in the Senate voted to reject
jurisdiction.33 Yet, the fact that nine Federalists voted to reject
jurisdiction, combined with the prior twenty-five to one vote to expel
Blount,34 reflect that something more than partisan politics may have
motivated these proceedings and that most of the senators refused to
32. See Michael B. Miller, Comment, The Justiciability of Legislative Rules and the "Political"
Political Question Doctrine, 78 CAL. L. REv. 1341, 1345 (1990).
33. See ELEANORE BUSHNELL, CRIMES, FOLLIES, AND MISFORTUNES: THE FEDERAL IM-
PEACHMENT TRIALS 36 (1992).
34. See id. at 29,36.
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convict a corrupt individual on an improper basis.35 In addition, Blount's
popularity in the West, based on his leadership of a controversial
movement to separate the West from the United States, may have
influenced the vote to reject jurisdiction as reflected in the fact that
every senator from the West voted against accepting jurisdiction.36 The
votes rejecting jurisdiction can also be read as reflecting the Senate's
reluctance to convict someone whom it already had expelled or who
was no longer in office at the time of his impeachment trial. Moreover,
the latter votes could be construed as reflecting a sentiment among
some senators that impeachment could be based only on indictable
offenses. Even though twenty-five of the twenty-six members of the
Senate voted to expel Blount for "a high misdemeanor, entirely
inconsistent with his public trust and duty as a Senator,"37 the term, as
used in that context, does not seem to have meant a crime, because no
one accused Blount of having committed any recognized crime or
violation of the law.38 Furthermore, the Senate never voted directly on
another question debated in the Blount impeachment; namely, whether
impeachable misconduct must have occurred during the performance of
official duties rather than apart from or outside the scope of those
responsibilities.
The principle underlying the nation's second impeachment,
involving United States District Judge John Pickering of New
Hampshire, is subject to debate. The House impeached Pickering by a
vote of forty-five to eight on March 2, 1803. The impeachment articles
charged drunkenness, profanity on the bench, and the rendering of
judicial decisions based neither on fact nor law.39 Although Judge
Pickering, like Senator Blount, did not appear on his own behalf in the
Senate proceedings, his son filed a petition arguing that Pickering was
so ill and deranged that he was incapable of exercising any kind of
judgment or transacting any business and, therefore, should not be
35. See PETER CHARLES HOFFER & N.E.H. HULL, IMPEACHMENT IN AMERICA, 1635-1805, at
162 (1984) ("Blount's case was an object lesson to both Federalists and Republicans: there was no
hope for a sweeping politicization of impeachment law without a suitable revision or extension of
the doctrine of impeachment.").
36. See id. at 162-63.
37. Id. at 152-53 (internal quotation and footnote omitted).
38. See id. at 153.
39. In particular, Pickering had been charged with ordering that a seized ship be delivered to
Eliphalet Ladd contrary to the law requiring a claimant to produce a tax certificate; refusing to hear
a witness on behalf of the United States also claiming the ship and then refusing to hear an appeal
on the same matter; and being inebriated and disorderly while sitting in his capacity as a judge. See
13 ANNALS OF CONG. 319-22 (1804); HINDS' PRECEDENTS, supra note 18, § 2328, at 690-92.
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removed from office for misconduct attributable to insanity.
4°
Nevertheless, the Senate voted eighteen to twelve to accept evidence of
Judge Pickering's insanity,41 nineteen to seven to convict,42 and twenty
to six to remove him from office.43 Consequently, Pickering became the
first federal official impeached by the House and convicted and
removed from office by the Senate.
Controversy still exists over whether Pickering's impeachment
should be construed as standing for the principle that the charges in an
impeachment proceeding are not limited to indictable criminal
offenses."4 On the one hand, Simon H. Rifkind, counsel for Justice
William 0. Douglas during a brief impeachment inquiry against the
latter in 1970, contended that Pickering was charged "'with three counts
of wilfully violating a Federal statute relating to the posting of bond in
certain attachment situations, and the misdemeanors of public
drunkenness and blasphemy."'45 On the other hand, the authors of one
important impeachment study claim that "no federal statute made
violation of the bond-posting act a crime, nor obviously were
drunkenness or blasphemy federal crimes. The Pickering impeachment
... confirms that the concept of high crimes and misdemeanors is not
limited to criminal offenses." 46 In his examination of the historical
foundations of the federal impeachment process, Raoul Berger added
that "'[a] system which did not provide for removal of a demented judge
because insanity was not a 'crime' would be sadly wanting.'
47
Yet, it may be unfair to interpret the Pickering impeachment in
either of these ways because, as Eleanore Bushnell has suggested, "[t]he
question [of guilt] was put in the form of asking [senators] whether the
judge stood guilty as charged,' 48 rather than whether the acts of which
he had been accused constituted high crimes and misdemeanors.
Consequently, the Senate's votes to convict and remove were not based
on any explicit acknowledgement that an impeachable offense,
indictable or otherwise, was actually involved. Indeed, several senators
40. See 13 ANNALS OF CONG. 328-30 (1804).
41. See id. at 332-33.
42. See HOFFER & HULL, supra note 35, at 217.
43. See id.
44. See Charles Morgan, Jr. et al., Impeachment: An Historical Overview, 5 SETON HALL L.
REV. 689,698 (1974).
45. Id. (quoting SPECIAL SUBCOMM. ON H. RES. 920 OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, 91ST CONG., LEGAL MATERIALS ON IMPEACHMENT 20 (Comm. Print 1970)).
46. Id. (footnote omitted).
47. Id. at 698-99 (quoting RAOUL BERGER, IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSTITUTIONAL
PROBLEMS 57 n.15 (1973)).
48. BUSHNELL, supra note 33, at 51-52.
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were offended by the form of the question put to them in the Pickering
impeachment trial. Senator Jonathan Dayton of New Jersey
had no doubt that Pickering had been proved guilty of most of the
acts described in the articles, but he [doubted] that any of them was
impeachable. Five senators-Federalists Dayton and Samuel White
(Delaware) and Republicans John Armstrong (New York),
Stephen R. Bradley (Vermont), and David Stone (North
Carolina)-withdrew from the court [of impeachment] when the
Senate agreed to put the question in the form of "guilty as
charged." The two Federalists objected to irregularities in the
proceedings and declined to be recorded on a solemn vote framed
so improperly and not directed to the essential question of whether
the charges did in fact describe high crimes and misdemeanors. 49
John Quincy Adams, by then a vigorous opponent of the
Republican attempts to unseat Federalist judges, observed that "the
three Republicans who withdrew probably also objected to certain
irregularities and did not want to separate from their party by voting
against the judge's conviction."5 0 One such irregularity was that, even
though it did not ultimately change the outcome of Pickering's impeach-
ment trial, the Senate allowed three senators to vote to convict and to
remove the judge in spite of their each having also served in the House
that had impeached the judge.
Another problem with relying on the Pickering impeachment as a
precedent is that party affiliation seems to have played a major role in
the Senate's votes to admit the evidence of insanity and to convict and
remove Pickering. All nineteen of the Senate's votes to convict the
Federalist judge came from Republicans, while all seven of Pickering's
acquittal votes came from Federalists.51 (In the Senate vote on removal,
only one Federalist-William H. Wells from Delaware-moved sides
and, in doing so, joined the nineteen Republicans who already voted to
convict the judge.2) Even the seemingly bipartisan vote to admit
evidence of Judge Pickering's insanity arguably could be explained on
partisan grounds: the Federalist senators may have moved for the
introduction of this evidence because they believed that proof of the
judge's insanity would save him from a guilty verdict given their position
that insanity could not be classified as a high crime or misdemeanor and
thus did not constitute an impeachable offense; while the Republicans
might have expected the admission of this evidence to have led to the
49. Id. at 51 (footnote omitted).
50. 1 MEMOIRS OF JOHN QUINCY ADAMS 309 (Charles Francis Adams ed., 1970).
51. See HOFFER & HULL, supra note 35, at 217.
52 See id.
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judge's conviction because they believed it demonstrated the need to
remove him before he could damage the judicial system any further.
The Senate's failure to convict and remove Justice Chase and
President Johnson also constitute dubious precedents despite their
notoriety. Some commentators, such as Chief Justice William
Rehnquist, view the outcomes of both of these impeachments as
primarily signaling the end of the Congress' attempt to impeach and
remove officials primarily for partisan reasons. 3 In Justice Chase's case,
the House began the formalities of his impeachment just one day after
approval of the articles of impeachment against Judge Pickering. The
House, by a vote of seventy-three to thirty-two, impeached Justice
Chase on March 12, 1804, for interfering with the due administration of
justice and for depriving various defendants, accused of violating the
Sedition Act, of the right to due process of law.54 Approximately one
year later, on March 1, 1805, the Senate voted to acquit Chase on all
eight of the articles of impeachment brought against him, even though a
majority of senators, numbering far less than two-thirds of the Senate,
found him guilty on three articles.
55
Following several unsuccessful attempts, the House, by a vote of
126 to 47, impeached President Andrew Johnson on February 24,
1868.56 Johnson angered many Republicans by opposing the drafting
and ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment and by vetoing
Reconstruction legislation,57 interfering with the enforcement of
Reconstruction, and trying to remove Republican appointees who did
not share his constitutional vision.58 To prevent Johnson from removing
Republican appointees from office,59 Congress passed the Tenure of
Office Act over the President's veto.60 Believing the act
53. See WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, GRAND INQUESTS: THE HISTORIC IMPEACHMENTS OF
JUSTICE SAMUEL CHASE AND PRESIDENT ANDREW JOHNSON 277-78 (1992).
54. Justice Chase was charged with condemning a defendant to death in violation of the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, refusing to discharge a grand jury
until it succumbed to his will and returned a specific indictment against a "seditious printer," and
interfering with a prosecutor, ordering him "to find some passage which might furnish the ground-
work of a prosecution" against the printer whom he insisted on having indicted. See 1 TRIAL OF
SAMUEL CHASE, AN ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE UNITED STATES, IMPEACHED BY THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES FOR HIGH CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS BEFORE THE SENATE OF THE
UNITED STATES 7-8 (De Capo Press 1970) (1805).
55. See 14 ANNALS OF CONG. 669 (1805).
56. See CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 1400 (1868).
57. See ERIC L. McKrTRICK, ANDREW JOHNSON AND RECONSTRUCTION 12 (1960).
58. See id. at 11-12, 291-92.
59. See DAVID MILLER DEwrr, THE IMPEACHMENT AND TRIAL OF ANDREW JOHNSON 180
(1903).
60. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 1966 (1867).
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unconstitutional, 61 President Johnson refused to abide by it and fired
Secretary of War Edwin Stanton on February 21, 1868.62 That same day
a resolution to impeach Johnson was referred to the Committee on
Reconstruction, 63 and three days later it was adopted on the floor of the
House.64 All but one of the specific charges brought against President
Johnson in the House involved violations of the Tenure of Office Act,65
while the tenth article charged that President Johnson, intending to
bring the Congress into "disgrace, ridicule, hatred, contempt, and
reproach," openly and publicly declared "with a loud voice certain
intemperate, inflammatory, and scandalous harangues" against
Congress and its laws.66 Ultimately, the Senate voted on only three of
the eleven articles of impeachment approved in the House. 67 Two of the
three involved his appointment of a new Secretary of War to replace
Stanton, and the other charged President Johnson with usurping the
powers of Congress.68 The Senate, whose membership was eighty
percent Republican, acquitted President Johnson by a vote on each
article of thirty-five guilty to nineteen not guilty, one less than the
number necessary for conviction. 69
The Chase and Johnson impeachments can be read as confirming
the House's view that it may impeach for nonindictable offenses,70 the
Senate's position that it can refuse to convict on such a basis, and
perhaps the general proposition that the impeachment process may not
be used to discipline Supreme Court Justices or Presidents for
differences of opinion on policy or law or for errors of judgment. Yet,
both impeachments arguably turned on other factors. The latter include
the following: all nine Federalist senators voted to acquit Chase, who
was a Federalist;7' some senators were concerned about the implications
of Chase's removal for the future judicial independence or doubted that
61. See CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 1350 (1868) (speech of Representative Beck,
February 22, 1868, in which he quotes from a letter sent by Johnson to the Senate).
62. The letter from President Johnson to Secretary Stanton was set out in the first article of im-
peachment. See CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 1647 (1868).
63. See id. at 1329-30.
64. See id. at 1400.
65. See id. at 1349-51.
66. See id. at 1648.
67. See CONG. GLOBE Supp., 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 411, 414-15 (1868).
68. See id.
69. See id.
70. See Morgan, supra note 44, at 699 (suggesting that the impeachment of Justice Chase
confirmed the House's view that it could impeach for both indictable and nonindictable offenses).
71. These Federalists were joined by six Republicans, who broke ranks to vote not guilty on
each article of impeachment. See BUSHNELL, supra note 33, at 85; REHNQUIST, supra note 53, at
108.
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Justice Chase committed an impeachable offense or engaged in any
misconduct;72 one of the prosecutors in the Senate, John Randolph, was
an unpopular politician and alienated fellow Republicans by strenuous-
ly opposing the Jefferson administration's settlement of a dispute
involving the Georgia legislature's rescission of a land grant it had made
a year earlier with different members who had been bribed to make the
conveyance by land speculators;73 and the House Managers may have
been overmatched by Justice Chase's defense counsel, led by Luther
Martin.7
4
Whereas one must speculate as to the reasons for the failure to
convict Justice Chase, "[t]hirty of the fifty-four senators who
participated in the Johnson trial filed written opinions in which they
explained their view[s] ... and why they had voted the way they did."'75
These statements reflect that the outcome of the Johnson impeachment
seems to have turned on several factors, including genuine doubts, even
among those who voted guilty, that impeachable acts had been charged
or proved;7 6 uncertainty that the Tenure of Office Act covered Secretary
of War Stanton;77 signals from President Johnson that he would be
easier to deal with in the future;78 and the fear harbored by many
Republicans that Benjamin Wade, a strident radical, who was the
Senate Pro Tempore and the person who would become President if
Johnson were ousted, would be even more difficult to deal with than
Johnson had been.79
The Chase, Johnson, Blount, and Pickering impeachments
illustrate some of the difficulties with relying on past impeachments as
representing simple principles of law. A prior impeachment trial might
provide some persuasive argument, evidence, or illustration of some
72. See REHNQUIST, supra note 53, at 113.
73. See id. at 110-13. See generally C. PETER MAGRATH, YAzOO: LAW AND POLITICS IN THE
NEW REPUBLIC, THE CASE OF FLETCHER V. PECK (1966).
74. See BUSHNELL, supra note 33, at 87.
75. REHNQUIST, supra note 53, at 240.
76. See BUSHNELL, supra note 33, at 159; see also REHNQUIST, supra note 53, at 240-46.
77. See BUSHNELL, supra note 33, at 159; see also REHNQUIST, supra note 53, at 246.
78. See BUSHNELL, supra note 33, at 159; see also REHNQUIST, supra note 53, at 247.
79. See BUSHNELL, supra note 33, at 159; see also REHNQUIST, supra note 53, at 246-47. Chief
Justice Rehnquist suggests that another possible reason for acquitting President Johnson may have
been that "the tactics of the managers from beginning to end undoubtedly antagonized not only
senators who were doubtful to begin with but some who leaned toward conviction at the beginning
of the Senate trial." Id. at 247. He notes one commentator's observation that the House Managers
"'exhausted every device, appealed to every prejudice and passion, and rode roughshod, when they
could, over legal obstacles in their ruthless attempt to punish the President for his opposition to their
plans."' Id. (quoting 2 SAMUEL ELIOT MORISON, THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN
PEOPLE, 1789-1877, at 517 (1965)).
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principle for guiding some future proceeding, but Congress retains the
discretion to change its mind, and the facts of any given case might
dictate different outcomes. For instance, Congress' failure to impeach
and remove a federal judge on the basis of an erroneous decision might
lead some judges to rely on this failure in developing a sense of
confidence or security that they may render constitutional decisions
with substantial, if not total, impunity from political retaliation. Yet,
Congress may not have brought any impeachments based on a judge's
decisions for a wide variety of reasons, and, in any event, Congress is
not bound by this failure to forego proceeding to try to impeach and
remove a federal judge if Congress believes it has good reason to try to
do so.
III
As one commentator summarized Chancellor Kent's thinking:
Settled rules, administered by an independent judiciary, constraints
upon discretion to prevent arbitrariness, and uniformity in
interpretation, were all necessary ingredients for the security of the
natural right of property. That right, in turn, was inextricably linked
to the right of liberty, both of which were entrusted to a judiciary
charged with discovering the common law. The judiciary was an
"enlightened body", made up of lawyers possessing a high degree
of cultivated reason which equipped them for the task. This
provided security from the dangers of factionalism arising from
democratically elected legislatures. 80
It is reasonable to assume that judges would examine the historical and
legal foundations of federal impeachment to illuminate the constitution-
al limitations on the appropriate grounds for judicial impeachments and
thus to further protect their independence or security from legislative
factionalism. As someone who appreciated the need for an independent
judiciary and judicial identification and enforcement of clear, inflexible
legal rules as protection against arbitrary majoritarian decision-making,
Kent almost certainly would have approved of the development of
similar rules for conducting impeachments. The development of such
rules-or at least the development of a common law from which such
rules may be discerned-would help to preclude the arbitrary if not
hostile decision-making that almost certainly results in their absence.
No such common law developed for two reasons. First, the nature
of the impeachment process is not amenable to simple or clear-cut
80. Carl F. Stychin, The Commentaries of Chancellor James Kent and the Development of an
American Common Law, 37 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 440,450-51 (1993).
[Vol. 74:91
1998] THE SEARCH FOR THE ELEMENTS OF IMPEACHABLE OFFENSES 107
principles or rules because the standard of impeachment is quite vague
and thus removal decisions turn on political judgments and
circumstances."' The process is concerned with the abuses of power, so
that the kinds of things for which certain officials may be impeached
vary widely, depending on the responsibilities of the official subject to
impeachment and the circumstances under which that official exercises
his or her respective responsibilities. Second, the Senate has voted to
convict and remove only seven officials in American history.82 This
number is quite small-perhaps, for some, too small-to serve as a
reliable or authoritative source of a common law of impeachment.
Third, the successful impeachment attempts largely-i.e., four of the
seven-involved statutory crimes.83 Hence, there is arguably little need
to codify impeachable offenses because they may have been largely
codified in the actions already deemed felonious by Congress.
While no formal common law of impeachment has developed, it is
possible to discern something analogous to it-the various sources of
decision relating to impeachment substitute in the impeachment context
for the traditional sources of the common law, including judicial
precedents. Notwithstanding the reasons a common law of impeachable
crimes never developed, the history of the impeachment clauses and the
history of Congress' exercises of its impeachment authority provide at
least some insight into the substantive scope of impeachable offenses.
Even if not fully determinative, the insights derived from such materials
provide some illumination of the constitutional meaning of "high
Crimes and Misdemeanors," and some insight is certainly better than
none. Consequently, I canvass below the historical materials relating to
impeachment to clarify the basic elements of impeachable offenses. The
first section focuses on the actus reus of impeachable offenses, i.e., the
bad acts for which certain high-ranking officials may be impeached. The
second section, relying primarily on postratification historical practices,
81. See GERHARDT, supra note 17, at 104-05.
82. All seven of those convicted were federal judges, each of whom was removed from office:
John Pickering (for drunkenness and senility), West Humphreys (for incitement to revolt and
rebellion against the nation), Robert Archbald (for bribery), Halsted Ritter (for engaging in actions
impugning the integrity of the federal judiciary), Harry Claiborne (for tax evasion), Alcee Hastings
(for conspiracy to solicit a bribe), and Walter Nixon (for giving false statements to a grand jury). See
id. at 185 n.4. Only Judge Humphreys and Judge Archbald were also disqualified from holding
future offices of honor or trust of the United States. See id.
83. Pickering, Humphreys, and Ritter were convicted of misconduct that was not, at least at the
time of their convictions, codified as criminal conduct. See Edwin Brown Firmage, The Law of
Presidential Impeachment, 1973 UTAH L. REv. 681, 695-98. The other four-Archbald, Hastings,
Claibore, and Nixon-were all convicted of misconduct codified as criminal. See id.; Edwin Brown
Firmage & R. Collin Mangrum, Removal of the President: Resignation and the Procedural Law of
Impeachment, 1974 DuKE L.J. 1023.
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elucidates the required mens rea of impeachable offenses, i.e., the
requisite intent or mind-set for an impeachment.
A. The Actus Reus of Impeachable Offenses
At common law, crimes consists of two essential elements-actus
reus and mens rea. While there is ample evidence to suggest that the
Founders did not intend for the impeachment process to track the
criminal law in all essential respects,84 the criminal law did provide a
backdrop, as did the impeachment experiences in England and the
states, for the drafting of the impeachment clauses of the Constitution.
The influence of these disparate sources on the latter clauses is evident
in both the language adopted and postratification historical practices.
Historical practices and the original understanding of the
Constitution suggest that the bad acts constituting impeachable offenses
are what the Founders understood to be political crimes. To appreciate
the essential nature of an impeachable offense, particularly of a so-
called "political crime," one needs to examine the different sources of
the constitutional language and design for impeaching certain high-
ranking federal officials.
1. The Nature of Political Crimes
The operative constitutional language-"high Crimes and
Misdemeanors"-is subject to at least two different interpretations. The
first is that the term "high" modifies traditional categories of criminal
offenses.85 The second is that the inclusion of some indictable crimes,
such as treason and bribery, as impeachable offenses limits impeachable
offenses to indictable crimes.
86
In the English experience prior to the drafting and ratification of
the Constitution, impeachment was primarily a political proceeding, and
impeachable offenses were political crimes. Even though he ultimately
shied away from the implications of his research, Raoul Berger
observed that the English practice treated .'[h]igh crimes and
misdemeanors' [as] a category of political crimes against the state."87
Berger supports this observation with quotations from relevant periods
in which the speakers use terms equivalent to "political" and "against
the state" to identify the distinguishing characteristics of an
84. See generally Rotunda, supra note 25, at 721-28.
85. See BERGER, supra note 47, at 53-59.
86. See id.
87. Id. at 61.
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impeachable event.88 In England, the critical element of injury in an
impeachable offense was injury to the state.89 The eminent legal
historian, William Blackstone, traced this peculiarity to the ancient law
of treason, which distinguished "high" treason-disloyalty against some
superior-from "petit" treason -disloyalty to an equal or an inferior 0
The late Professor Arthur Bestor further explained that "[t]his element
of injury to the commonwealth-that is, to the state itself and to its
constitution-was historically the criterion for distinguishing a 'high'
crime or misdemeanor from an ordinary one."91 The English
experience, therefore, reveals that there was
[a] difference of degree, not a difference of kind, separat[ing]
"high" treason from other "high" crimes and misdemeanors [and
that] [t]he common element in [English impeachment proceedings]
was [the] injury done to the state and its constitution, whereas
among the particular offenses producing such injury some might
rank as treasons, some as felonies and some as misdemeanors,
among which might be included various offenses that in other
contexts would fall short of actual criminality. 92
The constitutional convention and ratification campaign reflect a
widespread understanding of impeachment as a political proceeding and
impeachable offenses as essentially political crimes.93 The delegates at
the constitutional convention were intimately familiar with impeach-
ment in colonial America, which, like impeachment in England, had
basically been a political proceeding. Although the debates in the
convention primarily focused on the offenses for which the President
could be impeached and removed, there was general agreement that the
President could be impeached only for so-called "great" offenses.94
88. See id. at 59-62.
89. See Arthur Bestor, Impeachment, 49 WASH. L. REv. 255, 264 (1973) (reviewing BERGER,
supra note 47).
90. See id. Blackstone commented that:
TREASON ... in it's [sic] very name (which is borrowed from the French) imports a
betraying, treachery, or breach of faith.... [T]reason is... a general appellation, made
use of by the law, to denote ... that accumulation of guilt which arises whenever a
superior reposes a confidence in a subject or inferior .... and the inferior.., so forgets
the obligations of duty, subjection, and allegiance, as to destroy the life of any such
superior or lord.... [T]herefore for a wife to kill her lord or husband, a servant his
lord or master, and an ecclesiastic his lord or ordinary; these, being breaches of the
lower allegiance, of private and domestic faith, are denominated petit treasons. But
when disloyalty so rears it's [sic] crest, as to attack even majesty itself, it is called by
way of eminent distinction high treason, alta proditio; being equivalent to the crimen
laesae majestatis of the Romans.
Id. (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 75 (1769)).
91. Id. at 263-64.
92. Id. at 265.
93. See id. at 266.
94. See BERGER, supra note 47, at 88 (observing that "James Iredell, later a Supreme Court
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Drawing in part upon their understanding of the kinds of offenses for
which people may be impeached in England, various delegates gave
examples of the types of conduct justifying impeachment. In an
exchange at the constitutional convention between George Mason and
James Madison, Mason objected to limiting impeachment to treason
and bribery because he thought impeachment should reach "attempts to
subvert the Constitution.""9 He recommended that the delegates include
"maladministration" as an impeachable offense.96 Illustratively, Mason
referred approvingly to the contemporary impeachment of Warren
Hastings -formerly the Governor-General of India-as based not on
treason but an attempt to "subvert the Constitution."97 Madison
responded that "maladministration" was "[s]o vague a term [as to] be
equivalent to a tenure during [the] pleasure of the Senate." 98 Madison
preferred the phrase "high crimes and misdemeanors" as an
alternative99 that would encompass attempts to subvert the Constitution
and other similarly dangerous offenses. The debates at the convention
confirmed that impeachable offenses included abuses against the state
and thus were not limited to indictable offenses. Neither the debates nor
the relevant constitutional language eventually adopted, however,
identifies the specific offenses that constitute impeachable abuses
against the state.
Nevertheless, the debates in the ratification campaign also support
the conclusion that "other high Crimes and Misdemeanors" was not
limited to indictable offenses but rather included great offenses against
the federal government. 1°° For example, delegates to state ratification
conventions often referred to impeachable offenses as "great" offenses
(but not necessarily as criminal), and they frequently spoke of how im-
peachment should lie if the official "'deviates from his duty"'10' 1 or if he
"'dare to abuse the powers vested in him by the people."
'02
Justice, told the North Carolina convention [during the ratification campaign] that the 'occasion for
its exercise [impeachment] will arise from acts of great injury to the community"' (citation omitted)
(alteration in original)).
95. 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 550 (Max Farrand ed., 1911).
96. See id.
97. Id.; see Rotunda, supra note 25, at 723.
98. 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 95, at 550.
99. See id. According to Blackstone, "'High misdemeanors' in British usage included 'mal-
administration of such high officers, as are in public trust and employment."' Rotunda, supra note
25, at 723 (quoting 5 BLACKSTONE, supra note 90, at 121).
100. See Rotunda, supra note 25, at 723.
101. Id. (quoting 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUMON 47 (J. Elliott ed., 1836) (quoting Archibald MacLaine of South Carolina)).
102. Id. (quoting 2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUrION, supra note 101, at 169 (quoting Samuel Stiliman of Massachusetts)).
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Alexander Hamilton echoed such sentiments, observing:
The subject [of the Senate's] jurisdiction [in an impeachment trial]
are those offenses which proceed from the misconduct of public
men, or, in other words, from the abuse or violation of some public
trust. They are of a nature which may with peculiar propriety be
denominated POLITICAL, as they relate chiefly to injuries done
immediately to the society itself.103
Believing it unwise to submit the impeachment decision to the
Supreme Court because of "the nature of the proceeding,'" ° Hamilton
argued that the impeachment court could not be "'tied down"' by strict
rules, "'either in the delineation of the offense by the prosecutors [the
House of Representatives] or in the construction of it by the judges [the
Senate]."'15 Hamilton too believed that impeachable offenses
comprised a unique set of transgressions that defied neat delineation.
Both Justices James Wilson and Joseph Story expressed agreement
with Hamilton's understanding of impeachable offenses as political
crimes. In a series of lectures on the new Constitution given
immediately after his appointment to the Supreme Court, Justice
Wilson referred to impeachments as involving, inter alia, "political
crimes and misdemeanors.' 1 6 Justice Wilson understood the term
"high" describing "Crimes and Misdemeanors" to mean "political.' 17
Similarly, Justice Joseph Story recognized the unique political nature of
impeachable offenses:
The jurisdiction is to be exercised over offenses, which are
committed by public men in violation of their public trust and
duties. Those duties are, in many cases, political .... Strictly
speaking, then, the power partakes of a political character, as it
respects injuries to the society in its political character .... 108
Justice Story also viewed the penalties of removal and disqualification
as "limiting the punishment to such modes of redress, as are peculiarly
fit for a political tribunal to administer, and as will secure the public
against political injuries."'19 Justice Story understood "political injuries"
to be "'[s]uch kind of misdeeds ... as peculiarly injure the
103. Id. at 723-24 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 65, at 396 (Alexander Hamilton) (New Am.
Libr. ed. 1961)).
104. Id. at 724 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 65, supra note 103, at 398 (Alexander
Hamilton)).
105. Id. (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 65, supra note 103, at 398 (Alexander Hamilton)).
106. 1 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 426 (Robert Green McCloskey ed., 1967).
107. Id.
108. 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 385,
at 272-73 (Carolina Academic Press 1987).
109. Id. § 407, at 290.
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commonwealth by the abuse of high offices of trust."'110
In much the same manner as Hamilton, Justice Story understood
that the Framers proceeded as if there would be a federal common law
on crimes from which future Congresses could draw the specific or
particular offenses for which certain federal officials may be impeached
and removed from office. Justice Story explained that "no previous
statute is necessary to authorize an impeachment for any official
misconduct.""' Nor in Justice Story's view, could such a statute ever be
drafted because "political offenses are of so various and complex a
character, so utterly incapable of being defined, or classified, that the
task of positive legislation would be impracticable, if it were not almost
absurd to attempt it."112 The implicit understanding shared by both
Hamilton and Justice Story was that subsequent generations would not
have a federal common law of crimes to guide them in determining
impeachable offenses, but rather would have to define on a case-by-case
basis the political crimes serving as contemporary impeachable offenses.
The remaining problem is how to identify the nonindictable
offenses for which certain high-level government officials may be
impeached. Historical practices provide some insight into the answer to
this dilemma. Mindful of the problems with relying on impeachment
precedents as clear expressions of past, present, or future congressional
will, one can still identify some trends in formal impeachment practices.
First, of the fifteen men impeached by the House of Representatives,
only four were impeached technically on grounds which constitute a
criminal offense;113 and one of those four, Alcee Hastings, had been
formally acquitted of bribery prior to his impeachment."14 The House's
articles of impeachment against nine others included misuses of power,
each nonindictable federal offenses, at least at the time approved.
The Senate's attitude about the scope of impeachable offenses may
be more difficult to discern. The Senate, however, has convicted some
officials on the basis of nonindictable offenses, including: Judge
110. Bestor, supra note 89, at 263 (quoting 2 STORY, supra note 108, § 744, at 217).
111. 1 STORY, supra note 108, § 405, at 288.
112. Id. § 404, at 287.
113. The four were Secretary of War William Belknap (charged with accepting bribes); Harry
Claiborne (charged with wilfully making false tax statements); Alcee Hastings (charged with
conspiring to solicit a bribe and perjury), and Walter Nixon (charged with perjury). One should also
note that President Clinton was impeached by the House for misconduct-perjury and obstruction
of justice -constituting indictable offenses.
114. See Hastings v. Judicial Conference of the United States, 829 F.2d 91, 95 (D.C. Cir.
1987).
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Pickering (public drunkenness and blasphemy);"' Judge West H.
Humphreys (convicted and removed by the Senate for having publicly
advocated that Tennessee secede from the Union, organized armed
rebellion against the United States, accepted a judicial commission from
the Confederate Government, holding court pursuant to that
commission, and failing to fulfill his duties as a U.S. District Judge);
116
Judge Robert Archbald (convicted, removed, and disqualified by the
Senate for obtaining contracts for himself from persons appearing
before his court and others and for adjudicating cases in which he had a
financial interest or received payment- offenses for which, as the
Chairman of the House Impeachment Committee at the time conceded,
no criminal charges could be brought); 17 and Judge Halsted Ritter
(convicted and removed from office on the sole basis that he had
brought "his court into scandal and disrepute, to the prejudice of said
court and public confidence in the administration of justice therein, and
to the prejudice of public respect for and confidence in the Federal
judiciary[]"118). Even so, the recent trend in the Senate seems to be that
charging indictable offenses increases the likelihood of conviction, as
occurred with Judges Claiborne, Nixon, and Hastings.
Second, partisan loyalties and differences of opinion have played
occasional roles in the impeachment process. For example, heated
partisan differences between Republicans and Federalists or Democrats
over the appropriate handling and exercise of federal power were
driving forces in the impeachments of William Blount, John Pickering,
Samuel Chase, James Peck, West Humphreys, and Andrew Johnson.
Yet, in American history, no conviction has yet been based solely on
partisan grounds. In addition, in the cases of Justice Chase and
President Johnson, partisan differences may have given rise to the
initiation of their impeachment proceedings but seem to have dissipated
or become diffused as the two officials came to the brinks of conviction
and removal.
The impeachment attempt against President Nixon seemed to
follow a somewhat similar pattern to the impeachments of Justice Chase
and President Johnson. In 1974, President Nixon received strong
support from party loyalists in the House in the early phases of the im-
peachment investigation against him. By late July and early August of
115. See 13 ANNALS OF CONG. 319-22 (1804); HINDs' PRECEDENTS, supra note 18, § 2328, at
690-92.
116. See CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 2949-50 (1862).
117. See 48 CONG. REC. 8910 (1912).
118. 80 CONG. REC. 5606 (1936).
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1974, the House Judiciary Committee approved three articles of im-
peachment (each opposed by all of the Republicans on the Committee),
charging President Nixon with obstruction of justice, abuse of power,
and unlawful refusal to supply material subpoenaed by the House of
Representatives. 119  Behind the scenes, though, party loyalists
encouraged the President to resign, given their assessment that he was
likely to be both impeached and removed from office. By early August,
Nixon lost the support of all of his fellow Republicans in Congress once
he made public several tapes of recorded conversations in which he
acknowledged to his aides his involvement in some of the matters giving
rise to the impeachment inquiry. 120 The willingness of prominent and
loyal Republicans to join in acknowledging President Nixon's
impeachability and in encouraging him to resign obviously helped to
precipitate his resignation. Partisanship played a different role in
President Clinton's impeachment proceedings. Indeed, partisanship was
evident in the voting patterns in both the House and the Senate, with
Republicans in the House and the Senate overwhelmingly in favor of his
removal and Democrats in both chambers overwhelmingly opposed to
his removal. Yet, the apparent partisanship in those proceedings helped
to secure, ultimately, an acquittal rather than a conviction.
Given that certain federal officials may be impeached and removed
from office for committing serious abuses against the state, and that
these abuses are not confined to indictable offenses, the persistent
challenge has been to find contemporary analogues to the abuses
against the state that authorities such as Hamilton and Justices Wilson
and Story viewed as suitable grounds for impeachment. On the one
hand, these abuses may be reflected in certain statutory crimes. At least
one federal criminal statute-the bribery statute121 -codifies an
impeachable offense because bribery is expressly designated as such in
the Constitution. Violations of other federal criminal statutes may also
reflect abuses against the state sufficient to subject the perpetrator to
impeachment, insofar as the offenses involve a serious lack of judgment
119. See IMPEACHMENT OF RICHARD M. NIXON, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R.
REP. NO. 93-1305, at 1-4 (1974) [hereinafter NIXON IMPEACHMENT REPORT). Article 1, charging
obstruction of justice, received 27 affirmative and 11 negative votes, all 11 of which were cast by
Republicans. See Debate on Articles of Impeachment: Hearings of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 93rd
Cong. 329-31 (1974). Article 2, charging abuse of presidential powers, was adopted by a vote of
twenty-eight to ten, all the opposing votes for which came from Republicans. See id. at 445-47. The
last of the articles, dealing with the President's disregard of a subpoena issued by the House, was
approved twenty-one to seventeen with two Democrats joining fifteen Republicans in voting no. See
id. at 488-89.
120. See NIXON IMPEACHMENT REPORT, supra note 119, at 499.
121. 18 U.S.C. § 201 (1994).
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and respect for the law and their commission lowers respect for the
office. In other words, there are certain statutory crimes that, if
committed by public officials, reflect such lapses of judgment, breaches
of the public trust, disregard for the welfare of the state, and disrespect
for the law and the office held, that the occupant may be impeached and
removed from office for lacking the minimal level of integrity and
judgment sufficient to discharge the responsibilities of the office.
Not all statutory crimes, however, demonstrate unfitness for office.
For example, "a President's technical violation of a law making jay-
walking [or speeding] a crime obviously would not be an adequate basis
for presidential [impeachment and] removal."'122 Moreover, it is equally
obvious that some noncriminal activities may constitute impeachable
offenses. As Professor Laurence Tribe observed, "A deliberate
presidential decision to emasculate our national defenses or to conduct
a private war in circumvention of the Constitution would probably
violate no criminal code, but it should surely be deemed a ground of im-
peachment.' 1 23 The boundaries of congressional power to define the
kinds of political offenses that fall in between these extremes defy
simple specification because they turn on the circumstances under
which they have been committed (including the actor, the forum, other
means for redress, and the offensive act) and on the collective political
judgment of Congress. For instance, the profile or political popularity of
the targeted official (including his or her conduct) is a significant factor
in every impeachment attempt. Moreover, the history of impeachment
attempts illustrates that the more high-profile the target of an impeach-
ment the more serious the charges and the clearer and more compelling
the evidence of misconduct must be. This outcome should not be
surprising, for the higher the profile of the targeted official, the greater
the latter's resources to muster public support against congressional
recourse to punishment in the form of an impeachment, and the greater
the downside for those who try but fail in an impeachment setting to
oppose political figures who can muster significant political support.
2. The Requisite Connection to a Public Official's Performance or
Responsibilities
Clearly implicit within the prior discussion of the requisite bad acts
for which one may be impeached is that officials charged with having
committed impeachable offenses have committed the bad acts while in
122. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 294 (2d ed. 1988).
123. Id.
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office. Indeed, the delegates to the constitutional convention agreed to
limit impeachment to officeholders, in deliberate contrast to the English
practice in which anyone, except for a member of the royal family, could
be impeached.124 Moreover, every impeachment inquiry initiated thus
far has focused on misconduct allegedly committed while the targeted
official occupied an impeachable office.
The open question is not whether misconduct in office may lead to
impeachment, but rather what may count for impeachment purposes as
"in office." The most plausible answer is that it is permissible to bring an
impeachment action against an official at any time (i.e., while in office
or subsequent to resignation of or departure from office) as long as
some nexus exists between the misconduct and an impeachable official's
performance in or procurement of office.125 Two hypotheticals help to
illustrate this point. The first has to do with whether an official may be
impeached for conduct in office that does not relate to his or her formal
responsibilities. One possible answer to this hypothetical derives from
the viewpoint that everything a federal official does while in office is
related to his or her office because the person is technically always on
duty. According to this viewpoint, everything one does in office is
related to official status and thus the performance of official duties.
Historical practices seem to support this viewpoint. For instance,
the House impeached and the Senate convicted and removed Harry
Claiborne for income tax evasion. 126 Neither Claiborne's impeachment
by the House nor conviction by the Senate involved or turned on his
decision-making as a judge or the performance of his duties while on the
bench. Nevertheless, he was impeached by the House and convicted and
removed by the Senate.2 7 No one in the House spoke in defense of
Judge Claibome, while the Senate Impeachment Trial Committee
quickly dismissed Claiborne's objection that he could not be impeached
because the misconduct with which he was charged did not relate
directly to his performance of his official duties. 128
In other words, the Claiborne impeachment reinforces the notion
that someone who holds office also holds the public's trust, and an
124. See GERHARDT, supra note 17, at 10.
125. For a prolonged discussion of the legitimacy of postresignation impeachments, see id. at 79-
81.
126. See PROCEEDINGS OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE IN THE IMPEACHMENT TRIAL OF
HARRY E. CLAIBORNE, A JUDGE OF UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF
NEVADA, S. Doc. NO. 99-48, at 2-3, 298 (1986).
127. See id. at 298.
128. See Hearings Before the Senate Impeachment Trial Comm., 99th Cong., pt. 1, at 77, 80
(1986).
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officeholder who somehow violates that trust effectively loses the
confidence of the people and, consequently, must forfeit the privilege of
holding at least his or her present office. 129 In this context, conduct that
may be seemingly unrelated to the responsibilities of a particular office
(such as the failure to pay child support or alimony) may still relate to or
reflect on an official's integrity or ability to hold the people's trust.
Hence, Harry Claiborne's commissions of income tax fraud may not
have been directly related to, or even influenced his performance on,
the district court bench, but nevertheless justified his impeachment and
removal because they demonstrated some serious lapses of judgment
and if left unchecked by Congress had the potential for seriously
diminishing the public's confidence in the integrity of the federal bench.
Yet, upon inspection, it is possible to understand Judge Claiborne's
misconduct as having a nexus to his official duties. For one thing, his
duties as a federal judge entailed overseeing trials, including swearing in
witnesses and sentencing people convicted of tax evasion. His
conviction for the same offenses for which he might sentence other
people clearly robbed him of the requisite moral authority to discharge
his sentencing function. Moreover, the Report of the House Judiciary
Committee recommending Claiborne's impeachment to the full House
concluded that Claiborne's conviction (like Pickering's insanity more
than a century before) effectively disabled him from performing his
duties as a federal judge.
130
No doubt, President Clinton's acquittal could be construed as
having been based in part on the fact that his misconduct-lying about
or trying to conceal the nature of his relationship with Monica
Lewinsky-did not have a sufficiently close nexus to his official duties
nor a public dimension to warrant his removal. At least six senators
claimed that the absence of such a clear nexus was a factor for their
voting to acquit the President. 3'
It is also easy to imagine that a President who murdered someone
in a jealous rage has committed an impeachable offense. Even though
the crime appears to be unrelated to the President's formal constitution-
al duties, his criminal act considerably cheapens the presidency and
129. See Bestor, supra note 89, at 263 (commenting that the penalties for impeachment were
designed to "'secure the public against political injuries.' And [Justice Story] defined the latter as
'[s]uch kind of misdeeds ... as peculiarly injure the commonwealth by the abuse of high offices of
trust."' (quoting 2 STORY, supra note 108, § 788, at 256, § 810, at 278)).
130. See HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, IMPEACHMENT OF JUDGE HARRY E.
CLAIBORNE, JR., H. REP. No. 99-688, at 23 (1986); 132 CONG. REC. 30,251-58 (1986).
131. See, e.g., Closed Door Statements of Senators Beden, Breaux, Boxer, Conrad, Jeffords,
Leahy (released into Congressional Record) (Feb. 12, 1999).
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demonstrates such lack of respect for human life and disdain for the law
(which he is sworn to enforce faithfully) that Congress could reasonably
conclude he had effectively disabled himself from continuing his
function as President. As Professor Charles Black once observed:
Many common crimes-willful murder, for example-though not
subversive of government or political order might be so serious as
to make a president simply unviable as a national leader; I cannot
think that a president who had committed murder could not be
removed by impeachment. But the underlying reason remains
much the same; such crimes would so stain a president as to make
his continuance in office dangerous to public order.3
The second hypothetical is more difficult. It involves wrongdoing
committed before one assumes office. As a general matter, it is
noteworthy that no one has ever been impeached, much less removed
from office, for something he or she did prior to assuming an
impeachable position in the federal government. No doubt, anyone who
would ever be subjected to such an impeachment could argue that the
Congress' consistent failure ever to bring an impeachment on this basis
clearly indicates that Congress has never considered misconduct prior to
entering federal office to constitute an impeachable offense. One could
further argue that this failure, combined with the consistent
congressional practice of bringing impeachments only against officials
for their wrongful acts in office, establishes the principle that federal im-
peachments are limited to the wrongful conduct of impeachable officials
committed while they were in office. Moreover, impeaching someone
for something they did in their private life prior to entering public office
obviously frustrates the Framers' desire to preclude the impeachment of
private citizens. In other words, only the misconduct of public officials
committed while they are in office may constitute the bases for
impeachable offenses.
A counterargument is that one reason no one has ever been
impeached on this basis is that Congress has never tried to bring such an
impeachment. The failure to impeach someone for something they did
prior to entering federal office is not surprising, especially when one
considers the opportunity for doing so is likely to have been quite rare
and that, even had it arisen, Congress would likely have had great
difficulty in marshaling sufficient political support to proceed with an
impeachment. Nevertheless, if Congress' failure to bring certain kinds
of impeachments permanently precludes their initiation, then Congress
could never impeach someone on grounds that virtually everyone would
132. CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., IMPEACHMENT: A HANDBOOK 39 (1974).
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accept as legitimate, such as a President's commission of a murder while
in office. Moreover, the dividing line between the life or conduct of a
private citizen (for which the latter may not be impeached precisely
because it was done while he or she was a private citizen) and
misconduct in office for which one may be impeached is not so neat. For
example, it is easy to imagine situations in which impeachable offenses
could be based on present misconduct consisting of suppression or
misrepresentation of prior misconduct. Particularly in cases in which an
elected or confirmed official has lied or committed some other act of
wrongdoing to get into their present position, the misconduct that was
committed prior to entering office clearly bears on the propriety of the
way in which the present officeholder entered office as well as the
integrity of that official to remain in office.
The problem of trying to impeach someone for misconduct prior to
entering office is further complicated, however, by the fact that it may
manifest itself in two different ways, each requiring a separate analysis
for determining whether an impeachable offense is involved. First, the
public could elect, or the Senate could confirm, an official, even though
it knew that he or she had done something wrong. The only reason for
invoking the impeachment process in this circumstance is the perceived
need for Congress to express its independent judgment that the official
in question is not fit for office and should be punished.
The difficulty is that it is unclear how the nation has been injured
or the public trust has been violated when the electorate or the Senate
was fully informed of the misconduct and still elected or confirmed the
person. If the impeachment process is designed for Congress to remove
people to protect the public trust, that goal seems to have become
mooted when the public has passed on the conduct involved. It is
especially difficult to envision how an impeachable offense is involved
or an impeachment could be successfully pursued in a case in which
Congress is trying to impeach someone for a reason about which the
Senate knew at the time it confirmed the person. If the conduct made
known to the electorate or the Senate was committed in an elected or
confirmed official's private capacity prior to his or her election or
confirmation, it is even less clear how the interests protected by the im-
peachment process are implicated. In the latter circumstance, all that
can be safely said is that, as a matter of common sense and good
policy-but not constitutional law-Congress may wish to take into
consideration the information made public during the election and the
nature of the alleged offense involved during its deliberations on im-
peachment, because a successful impeachment ultimately depends on
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the credibility of Congress' claim that it is acting in the best interests of
the people, who arguably have ratified or at least expressed no
disapproval of the prior conduct in question.
133
The other circumstance is when the public or the Senate did not
know about the misconduct of an official prior to his or her election or
confirmation. In this situation, Congress could claim that something
akin to voter fraud occurred, that the integrity of the electoral or
confirmation process is involved, and that it has a fiduciary obligation to
remedy the situation by conducting an impeachment either to put into
effect what the voters likely would have done had they been fully
informed or to determine the official's continued fitness to serve in light
of the new information.1 14 The kinds of factors Congress might consider
in determining the existence of an impeachable offense or the propriety
of an impeachment are the seriousness of the misconduct, its timing
(i.e., how old it is), the degree to which the offense was discussed in the
election or confirmation, the official's job performance thus far in spite
of it, and the proximity of the next relevant election (Congress might
prefer to let the voters decide).
135
133. A variation of this situation occurred with respect to the election of Alcee Hastings to the
House of Representatives in 1993. See Alan I. Baron, The Curious Case of Alcee Hastings, 19 NOVA
L. REV. 873, 902 (1995). Even though Hastings had been impeached and removed in 1989 from the
office of federal district judge, his subsequent election to the House of Representatives is most
commonly viewed as an acceptance of his claims of innocence by the citizens of his district, an
expression of their indifference to the conduct that led to his removal, or a statement by them that
the conduct for which he was impeached was irrelevant to their election of him as their
Representative in the House. See GERHARDT, supra note 17, at 60.
134. Shortly before Justice Hugo Black's confirmation, rumors surfaced in the Senate chamber
about his possible affiliation with the Ku Klux Klan ("KKK") as a younger man. Black denied the
rumor on the Senate floor, but after his confirmation, he publicly addressed the issue in a short radio
address-the only time he ever addressed the issue publicly. In his address, he admitted that he had
been a member of the KKK only for a short while during his youth and that he did not intend ever
again to talk about the issue publicly. It took some time for the uproar to die down. Even though
there were threats of impeachment leveled against Justice Black, nothing became of them. See
HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES AND PRESIDENTS: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF APPOINTMENTS TO
THE SUPREME COURT 47-48 (3d ed. 1993); VIRGINIA VAN DER VEER HAMILTON, HUGO BLACK:
THE ALABAMA YEARS 275, 278-79, 285, 292, 294-96 (1972). Of course, Black was not under oath
when he denied the rumor on the Senate floor nor did he suppress evidence in the midst of his
confirmation hearing. Nevertheless, the question that intrigues many people today is whether a
judge or justice who is believed to have lied in a confirmation hearing but has been confirmed may
be impeached for having lied under oath-a federal felony. There is little doubt that such
misconduct would constitute an impeachable offense because it is not only very serious but it also
has a nexus to the office obtained because the lie arguably helped the person secure the position. No
doubt, likely defenses would include that the person did not lie under oath, that the statement made
was not pivotal or material to the proceedings, and that the offense alleged generally was not
serious.
135. In any event, constitutional safeguards apply to the impeachment process and should
circumscribe congressional efforts to define political crimes. The Constitution includes several
guarantees to ensure that Congress will deliberate carefully prior to making any judgments in an im-
peachment proceeding: (1) when the Senate sits as a court of impeachment, "they shall be on Oath
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3. The Relevance of Other Avenues of Redress
Several impeachment attempts have raised questions about
whether impeachment was the appropriate process for punishing the
targeted officials, and the failure to impeach or convict in each of these
cases seems to have turned at least to some extent on the judgment of
some members of Congress that other avenues of redress were better-
suited than impeachment to deal with the conduct in question. For
instance, part of Justice Chase's defense, as put forward by Luther
Martin, one of his counsel, was that impeachment was ill-suited to deal
with less than ideal judicial behavior and that the judicial process was
better-suited for dealing with mistakes of law or intemperate outbursts
by trial judges.136 Similarly, many senators acknowledged in Andrew
Johnson's impeachment trial that the political or electoral process was
the appropriate forum for holding Johnson accountable for his firing of
Edwin Stanton or his efforts to impede the progress of
Reconstruction.137 More recently, many of President Clinton's defenders
in the House and Senate claimed that criminal prosecution or the
judgment of history, but not impeachment, was the appropriate means
by which to hold him accountable for his misconduct. 13
8
Subsequently, no impeachment attempt based solely on a judge's
performance on the bench, particularly his decisions or rulings, has
proceeded beyond the initial inquiry stage in the House of
Representatives. On three occasions Associate Justice William 0.
Douglas had impeachment resolutions introduced and impeachment
inquiries launched against him-in 1953 for granting a stay of execution
in the case of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, in 1957 for marrying for the
or Affirmation," U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 3, cl. 6; (2) at least two-thirds of the Senators present must
favor conviction in order for the impeachment to be successful, see id.; and (3) in the special case of
presidential removal, the Chief Justice must preside so that the Vice-President, who otherwise
normally presides, is spared from having to oversee the impeachment trial of the one person who
stands between him and the presidency; see id.
Two other safeguards are political in nature. First, members of Congress seeking reelection
have a political incentive to avoid any abuse of the impeachment power. The knowledge that
they may have to account to their constituency may lead them to deliberate cautiously on im-
peachment questions. Second, the cumbersome nature of the impeachment process makes it
difficult for a faction guided by base political motives to impeach and remove someone from
office. Thus, these structural and political safeguards help to ensure that, as a practical matter,
"[slome type of wrongdoing must exist in order for an impeachment to lie-there can be no im-
peachment for mere policy difference." Rotunda, supra note 25, at 726 (footnote omitted).
136. See HOFFER & HULL, supra note 35, at 248.
137. See generally REHNQuiST, supra note 53, at 271.
138. See, e.g., Closed Door Statements of Senators Biden, Breaux, Byrd, Cleland, Collins,
Durbin, Graham, Kerrey, Kohl, Lautenberg, and Wellstone (released into the Congressional
Record) (Feb. 12, 1999).
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fourth time, and in 1970 for the supposed immorality of his lifestyle and
his judicial decision-making. 39 Nothing came from any of these. In 1970,
for instance, the House Judiciary Committee concluded that a
nonpartisan basis for proceeding against Justice Douglas was absent and
thus declined to investigate him further.
140
If the absence of any successful impeachment attempt aimed at a
judge's decisions or rulings has any significance, it might be for two
reasons. First, as this symposium no doubt will demonstrate, judicial
independence requires substantial freedom from political retaliation
against judicial opinions, decisions, or rulings. Second, impeachment is
not the only, or perhaps the preferred, mode of redress for any
misconduct or questionable act by an impeachable official. Not all
misconduct or mistakes made by high-ranking governmental officials,
including the President, necessarily trigger or merit impeachment. Im-
peachment was not designed to remedy every mistake (or crime, for
that matter) conmitted by an impeachable official. Instead, other
mechanisms exist for misconduct falling short of the kind of harm a
political crime would entail. For instance, the political process often
offers an appropriate forum for redress for some of the misconduct
Presidents and other high-ranking officials might have committed.
Moreover, the appellate system provides an adequate means or forum
for vindicating any wrong done by means of a decision, opinion, or
ruling by a federal district or appellate judge. The critical question is
whether the vindication provided by the appellate system fully or
adequately redresses the wrongs caused by means of judicial opinions or
acts. If so, then recourse to impeachment seems both unnecessary and
excessive. In addition, the Judicial Disability Act provides various
remedies, including temporary suspension of a district or appellate
judge who has become incapacitated or unable to perform his or her




B. The Requisite Mens Rea
Although the Founders evidenced no intent to equate common law
139. See MARY L. VOLCANSEK, JUDICIAL IMPEACHMENT: NONE CALLED FOR JUSTICE 7
(1993).
140. See SPECIAL SUBCOMM. ON H.R. RES. 920 OF THE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 91ST
CONG., FINAL REPORT ON ASSOCIATE JUSTICE WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS 349 (Comm. Print 1970);
see also GERHARDT, supra note 17, at 29.
141. See Judicial Disability Act, Pub. L. No. 96-458, 94 Stat. 2035 (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. §§ 331-332, 372, 604 (1994)).
[Vol. 74:91
1998] THE SEARCH FOR THE ELEMENTS OF IMPEA CHABLE OFFENSES 123
crimes with political crimes for impeachment purposes, their rhetoric
sometimes suggested that the elements might parallel each other. In
particular, many Framers seemed to presume that some sort of
malicious or bad intent would be an element of an impeachable offense.
In discussing the scope of impeachable offenses in the constitutional
convention, James Madison suggested that a President's "deliberate"
attempt to weaken national defenses should qualify as an impeachable
offense. Similarly, in The Federalist Papers, Alexander Hamilton
suggested that the exercise of "Will" rather than judgment would
constitute a nonjudicial act by a judge, something that presumably
would constitute in his view an abuse of judicial power. 142 The term
"Will" clearly implies a conscious or deliberate mind-set. In addition,
the prominent anti-Federalist Brutus suggested that judicial impeach-
ment would be inappropriate if based on a judge's decisions but would
be legitimate if the judge "had wicked motives" 141-plainly implying
that some kind of malicious intent had to be present in order for a
legitimate judicial impeachment to take place.
Review of the records of debates in some actual impeachment
proceedings reveals that some kind of bad or malicious intent
constitutes an element of an impeachable offense. The most extensive
discussion of this requirement occurred in the impeachment
proceedings brought against Justice Samuel Chase. One of the central
issues in Chase's impeachment turned on his intent. Malicious or bad
intent was an element of each of the charges made against Chase.
14
Chase's prosecutors, led by John Randolph, argued that Chase's bad
intent need not be proved but rather should be inferred from the
outrageousness of his actions on the bench. 45 The point of this
argument was three-fold. First, it saved the prosecution from having to
prove something that normally would have been nearly or perhaps
absolutely impossible to prove-bad or malicious intent. Second, by
making bad motive an element but one would that would be relatively
easy to show, Chase's prosecutors were trying to develop a standard
that could be used for ousting Chase but that could avoid constituting a
basis of removal for purely or largely partisan reasons. In the absence of
bad intent, Chase's actions were not especially unusual on the bench.
142. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 2, at 440 (Alexander Hamilton).
143. Brutus, Brutus Essays IV, XI, XII, and XV N.Y. J., Nov. 29, 1787, Jan. 31, 1788, & Feb. 14,
1788; reprinted in THE ESSENTIAL ANTIFEDERALIST 201, 220-21 (W.B. Allen & Gordon Lloyd eds.,
1985).
144. See generally HOFFER & HULL, supra note 35, at 236-37.
145. See id. at 244.
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The presence of bad intent made Chase look more reprehensible and
made his ouster, if it did occur, more difficult to use as a precedent for
partisan retaliations by the Federalists in the future. Third, the inference
of motive from action melded the doctrines of dangerous tendency and
criminal culpability that would have been difficult to prove separately in
Chase's case but that combined would make Chase look even worse.
146
Chase defended against these charges by arguing that he acted in
good faith in each of the incidents mentioned in the articles of impeach-
ment. In his opening remarks in his impeachment trial, Chase
categorically "den[ied], in every instance, the improper intentions with
which the acts charged, are alleged to have been done, and in which
their supposed criminality altogether consists.' 147 His core defense was
that "he had not violated any laws and exhibited nor harbored any bad
intentions in any of the actions claimed to be improper. These two
themes also dominated the arguments of his attorneys during the
trial.' 1 48 In particular, Chase's counsel argued that bad intent had to be
proved by the prosecution but that the prosecution had failed to prove it
in Chase's case.
49
Moreover, the question put to the Senate at the end of Chase's trial
was whether Chase was "guilty or not guilty of a high crime or
misdemeanor, as charged in the Article of impeachment.' 50 This
formulation "underlined the need for proof of 'evil intent,' which, to
[then-Senator] John Quincy Adams and some Republicans, was never
satisfactorily established."''
The necessity of establishing bad or malicious intent was also a
significant factor in the next impeachment trial, that of James Peck. In
1830, the House impeached Peck on a single charge. The thrust of the
charge was that Peck abused his authority by citing in contempt and
imprisoning a man who had criticized Peck's rulings. Peck contended
that he could not be impeached absent proof of bad intent. 52 As one of
his counsel argued in summation, Peck could not be impeached for his
actions because his actions did not "proceed from the evil and malicious
intention with which [he] has been charged, and which it is absolutely
146. See id.
147. 1 TRIAL OF SAMUEL CHASE 14 (1970) (internal quote omitted).
148. BUSHNELL, supra note 33, at 66.
149. See HOFFER & HULL, supra note 35, at 245-50.
150. Id. at 252 (internal quotation and footnote omitted).
151. Id. at 253.
152. See ARTHUR J. STANSBURY, REPORT OF THE TRIAL OF JAMES H. PECK 62 (De Capo
Press 1972) (1833).
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necessary should have accompanied it, to constitute the guilt of an
impeachable offense.153 A bare majority of the Senate voted not to
convict Peck.
The need to establish bad intent arose again in the impeachment
trial of Andrew Johnson. The first major question raised in his trial was
whether Johnson violated the Tenure in Office Act and, if he did,
whether he had done so "willfully.' 15 4 Like Chase, Johnson contended
that he acted in good faith, i.e., that he lacked malicious intent. As one
of his defense counsel, former Supreme Court Justice Benjamin Curtis,
argued in the opening remarks of his defense of Johnson:
I suppose everyone will agree that so long as the President of the
United States, in good faith is endeavoring to take care the laws be
faithfully executed, ... and is preserving, protecting and defending
the Constitution of the United States, although he may be making
mistakes, he is not committing high crimes or misdemeanors. 55
Sixteen witnesses appeared on Johnson's behalf, many of whom gave
testimony designed to "show that President Johnson had consulted his
cabinet about his veto of the Tenure [in] Office Act, that he honestly
believed the law to be unconstitutional, and that he had no inclination
to violate any laws."'56 Johnson's defense seems to have made a
difference on the outcome, as six of the seven Republicans who voted
not to convict him explained in written opinions filed after the trial that
the prosecutors in Johnson's trial had not established or proved Johnson
had done something impeachable, i.e., done something that horribly
hurt the Republic with bad intent. 57
Subsequently, every official who has been the target of an impeach-
ment inquiry has had the opportunity to assert any defense he has
thought appropriate. In two of the cases-the impeachment trials of
Charles Swayne158 and Harold Louderback159-the Senate did not
153. Id. at 328.
154. See BUSHNELL, supra note 33, at 138.
155. 1 TRIAL OF ANDREW JOHNSON 386 (De Capo Press 1970) (1868).
156. BUSHNELL, supra note 33, at 149.
157. See id.; see also REHNQUIST, supra note 53, at 241-45.
158. In 1904, the House impeached Charles Swayne primarily for corruption, including willfully
filing false claim reports and accepting the free services of a private railroad car from a company that
sometimes appeared in his court; however, the Senate did not convict him. See PROCEEDINGS IN
THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE MATlER OF THE IMPEACHMENT OF CHARLES
SWAYNE, JUDGE OF THE UNITED STATES IN AND FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA, S.
DOC. NO. 58-194 (3d Sess. 1905).
159. The House impeached Harold Louderback for the manner of his appointment and removal
of receivers. Louderback's defense consisted in large part of his demonstration of his good faith in
his appointment and removal of receivers. See generally PROCEEDINGS OF THE UNITED STATES
SENATE IN THE TRIAL OF IMPEACHMENT OF HAROLD LOUDERBACK, UNITED STATES DISTRICT
JUDGE FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA, S. Doc. NO. 73-73 (1933).
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convict the targeted judges. In the cases where the defense failed, such
as the impeachment trials of Halsted Ritter16 and Harry Claiborne,1
61 it
seems to have been because Congress found that bad intent had been
proved rather than concluded that such a finding was unnecessary.
162
IV
Attempting to impeach federal judges on the basis of their
decisions poses some serious dangers that Kent neither acknowledged
nor addressed. First, it would unquestionably chill the exercise of
judicial review. No doubt, any judge who feels inclined, even in good
faith, to rule in a similar manner as another judge who has been
impeached for his or her decisions will be inclined not to do so in order
to preserve his or her job.1 63
Second, since no judge has ever been impeached on the basis of his
or her decisions, judges would likely not know in advance the kinds of
decisions warranting impeachment. To be sure, Congress' failure to
impeach a federal judge for his or her decisions has limited meaning. As
I have already shown, many reasons for Congress' failure to act exist,
but none of which amounts to a considered congressional judgment that
proceeding to impeach a judge on the basis of his or her decisions would
be unjustified.164 Even if such a judgment were discernable, Congress is
not bound by it.
Third, impeaching judges for their decisions runs the risk of
partisan retaliation. During and immediately after Chase's impeach-
ment trial, many Republicans feared that the easier impeachment
160. One article of impeachment against Ritter charged that he had evaded paying income tax.
Ritter countered that he had not "willfully" tried to evade paying income tax. While the Senate
voted not to convict Ritter on the basis of this article, he was convicted and removed on the basis of
a catch-all article that charged, as one of the House Managers Chatton Sumners explained, that "the
sum total of the things he has done has made the people doubt his integrity as a judicial officer."
PROCEEDINGS OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE IN THE TRIAL OF IMPEACHMENT OF HALSTED L.
RITTER, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA, S. Doc.
No. 74-200, at 42 (1936).
161. The House Managers charged Claiborne with "willful, intentional, and fraudulent" evasion
of income taxes. See BUSHNELL, supra note 33, at 299. In his defense against these charges,
Claiborne argued that he had been "damaged by careless tax preparers [and] victimized by an
inexorable band of federal prosecutors bent on his destruction." Id. at 295. In other words,
Claiborne admitted filing erroneous tax returns but claimed that the mistakes were not intentional.
Senators who had voted not guilty on at least one article claimed that "Claibore had made
negligent, not willful, errors on his income taxes." Id. at 301.
162. See id. at 301-07.
163. Of course, intimidation is one of the reasons for threatening to impeach judges for their
decisions. The question is whether following through on the threat enhances or diminishes the
quality of judicial performance.
164. See supra Part III.
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became, the easier their political enemies could, once they returned to
power, return the favor and target Republican appointees 65
Moreover, impeaching judges for their decisions casts doubt on the
utility or efficacy of the appellate system. If the decisions on which an
impeachment action have been based have been affirmed by some
higher court, then it makes little sense to single out a judge for punitive
action. At the very least it appears as if a judge who is joined in an
opinion or supported by other judges had good reason to take the
position he or she did.166 If, however, a higher court reverses the rulings
of the targeted judges, then it appears as if the errors have been fully
rectified. It is not clear what impeachment would add because the faulty
or erroneous judgment has been directly challenged and reversed.
These risks do not necessarily preclude the bringing of an impeach-
ment action based on a judge's decisions. Kent's suggestion that
impeaching judges based on their decisions seems more reasonable
when one tests it against what one would have to establish in order to
satisfy each of the essential elements of impeachable offenses. Perhaps
the most serious problem is demonstrating the requisite mens rea, which
requires a showing that the judge acted in bad faith. In turn, bad faith
probably requires a showing that he or she ruled the way he or she did
regardless of an awareness of the wrongness of the decision.
Alternatively, to establish bad faith one might have to show that a judge
ruled the way he or she did knowing that he or she was violating the
Constitution or illegitimately exercising the power or authority of
another branch.
Establishing bad intent is no easy thing (if the Chase and Johnson
impeachments are any indication), for, in the case of a lower court
judge, the latter would almost certainly begin the impeachment
proceedings with a presumption of innocent intent, leaving to the
prosecution the difficult burden of showing that a decision was not just
bad, but deliberately erroneous. It would be difficult for the prosecution
to meet its burden if the judge's decisions have been upheld by some
higher court or the judge insists that he or she was acting in good faith
throughout his or her decision-making in the disputed cases.
A different situation arises, however, if the abuses allegedly
committed by the targeted judge(s) persist or recur. Imagine a judge
who has concluded that a certain interpretation of the Constitution is
legitimate and makes a decision based on that judgment in a particular
165. See HOFFER & HULL, supra note 35, at 262.
166. See REHNQUIST, supra note 53, at 118.
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case but later has that judgment reversed by the Supreme Court
because of the latter's contrary reading of the Constitution. Here, use of
the impeachment process to punish the judge is unnecessary, for the
judge's error has been fully remedied. Yet, if the judge were to persist in
subsequent cases to ignore or, worse, to condemn the Court's decision
and assert the authority to rule in spite of the latter decision, we have a
different case. In the latter situation, impeachment seems more
appropriate because bad intent could be reasonably inferred from the
judge's actions, and an abuse of power-flagrantly disregarding the
judgment of a higher court-is reasonably apparent.
167
The counterexample is John Pickering, whom the House im-
peached and the Senate convicted and removed from the bench on the
basis of insanity.168 In Pickering's case, the formation of the requisite
mens rea was an impossibility because of the nature of his infirmity.
Indeed, his problem was his infirmity, not deliberate abuse of power.
Those in favor of Pickering's impeachment obviously circumvented or
disregarded the need to establish the requisite mens rea or at least
something paralleling the mens rea necessary for the establishment of a
criminal offense.
The Pickering impeachment is, however, distinctive for three
reasons. First, one might argue that mens rea in the impeachment
context differs from the mens rea in the criminal context. The former
kind of mens rea might include not only malicious intent but also the
inability to exercise the requisite mental abilities to perform one's
constitutional duties. If this first basis for distinction seems problematic
because of the slippery slope it might erect or because it is based on a
single case, two other bases for distinction are conceivable. Pickering's
mental instability fully disabled him from performing his judicial duties.
Moreover, the impeachment and conviction of Pickering might have
been appropriate because no other means of redress was then available.
True, the appellate system could have been used repeatedly to correct
his mistakes, but the fact of his insanity promised judicial resources
would be increasingly used to remedy the errors he repeatedly
committed and the erratic behavior in which he repeatedly engaged in
167. This hypothetical is not unrealistic. For instance, Federal District Judge Willis Ritter
repeatedly refused to comply with an order to recuse himself issued by the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit. Ritter died while the case was pending with the Judicial Council. See Charles
Gardner Geyh, Informal Methods of Judicial Discipline, 142 U. PA. L. REv. 243, 264 n.87 (1993). If
the Judicial Council had failed to resolve the matter or if Judge Ritter had persisted in refusing to
comply with an order from a superior court, the matter likely would have been appropriate for im-
peachment.
168. See supra notes 39-52 and accompanying text.
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the courtroom. Today, the Judicial Disability Act provides temporary
suspension of a judge for mental disability or insanity.'69 No such
mechanism existed in the days of Pickering, so the only realistic
alternatives were to persuade him to leave the bench (something that
would not work because of his state of mind) or impeachment.
Of course, some of the factors relevant to determining the
propriety of impeaching a federal judge for his or her decisions do not
apply when the targeted official is a Supreme Court Justice. In the latter
circumstance, there is no realistic possibility of an appeal. Moreover, the
Justice is likely to feel greater freedom in not following Supreme Court
precedent, though such a disposition is quite common because of the
traditional view among Justices that constitutional precedents are
entitled to less deference than common law or nonconstitutional ones
and thus oftentimes might deride prior decisions or steadfastly refuse to
follow them.170
Of course, the major problem with trying to impeach a Justice
because of his or her dissents is that dissents are not the law and do not
carry any legal weight. Moreover, there is an even bigger problem if the
decisions for which a Justice is being targeted for impeachment are not
lone dissents, for then it seems patently unfair to single the Justice out
for disparate or punitive treatment. The more people who have joined
the dissenting Justice the more credible the latter's belief in the
soundness of his or her opinions. In addition, persistent dissenting-
even on one's own-is not necessarily a sign that a Justice is operating
recklessly or maliciously. Given the frequency with which some dissents
have later become the law, a Justice has good reason to believe that
dissenting repeatedly is an appropriate way to act on the basis of what
he or she believes to be a sound constitutional point of view. To put the
point slightly differently, there is ample precedent for Justices to engage
in such decision-making. Hence, establishing the requisite mens rea for
the impeachment of a Supreme Court Justice for his or her decisions
would seem to be nearly impossible. It would require aberrant behavior
of such unprecedented proportions or such extreme expressions of
disdain that insanity would likely appear to be the more likely
explanation for the judge's behavior than malicious intent.
169. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
170. See MICHAEL J. GERHARDT & THOMAS RowE, CONSTrIUTIONAL THEORY:
ARGUMENTS AND PERSPECTIVES 180 (1993).
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CONCLUSION
Chancellor Kent never set out to study the impeachment process
systematically. One would not have expected that this great expositor of
the common law would figure prominently in clarifying a perennial
question about the proper scope of impeachable offenses. Yet, his
pronouncement about the legitimacy of basing a judicial impeachment
on a judge's decisions is of such great contemporary interest that it
cannot be ignored. Moreover, the methodology Kent suggested for
elucidating the common law provides a useful model for trying to
determine the extent to which his statement aptly fits the scheme of
federal impeachment set forth in the Constitution.
While it is difficult (if not dangerous) to try to clarify the elements
of impeachable offenses, some illumination is better than none. The
vagueness of the impeachment standard complicates developing simple
rules to govern its exercise. Nevertheless, bringing some clarity or order
to the exercise of the impeachment authority is crucial for preventing
abuses and for ensuring some minimal fairness. A close examination of
the sources of decision on federal impeachment reflects the likely
prerequisites of impeachable offenses. At the very least, the actus reus
or bad acts are political crimes. Moreover, many impeachment attempts
have turned on the notion that the bad acts that qualify as impeachable
offenses must cause serious harm to the Republic and have a close
nexus to the actor's official duties. In addition, some kind of bad or
malicious intent seems necessary to reflect that the misconduct did not
result from a simple or innocent mistake in judgment rather than a
desire to cause or some extremely reckless disregard about the
possibility of causing some serious harm to the Republic. In some cases,
other available systems of redress, such as the appellate process, might
have some impact on the perceived necessity for making recourse to the
impeachment process.
The search for the elements of impeachable offenses helps to
clarify the extent to which Chancellor Kent's belief that impeachment
based on a judge's decisions is sound. Both actus reus and mens rea
would be difficult to prove in a case involving a single decision. The
actus reus would be difficult to prove because the appellate system
might provide full restitution or protection against harm to any
individuals or the Republic. In addition, mens rea would be difficult to
prove if there were only a single decision involved, particularly if other
judges on the same or some higher court have expressed agreement
with its reasoning or outcome. Consequently, the likeliest scenario in
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which a federal judge might face impeachment because of his or her
decisions would be one in which the judge has consistently flouted the
authority of some binding principle of law or higher court. As one might
imagine, such a scenario is likely to be quite rare.
Nevertheless, the identification of even this singular circumstance
in which impeaching a judge for his or her decision-making helps to
clarify the scope of impeachable offenses. Such clarification helps to
define the limits of the federal impeachment process and the range of
judicial independence secured by the Constitution. Such clarification is
also a function of the enduring wisdom of Chancellor Kent, whose
legacy no longer can fairly be said to be limited strictly to the judicial
development of the early American common law and equity.

